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invariant country-specific effects such as distance or common language. 
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EFFECTS OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS USING A STATIC AND 
DYNAMIC GRAVITY EQUATION  
 
1. Motivation 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the static effects of preferential trade 
agreements between several economic blocs and areas: The European Union (EU-15), 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Central American Common Market 
(CACM), Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Cuba, Magreb region (MAGREB: 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya), Mashrek region (MASHREK: Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and other Mediterranean countries (Turkey, Cyprus and 
Malta) in a static and dynamic panel data framework. The period under study is from 
1980 to 1999, when the second wave of regionalism flourished and before the EU 
changed to a monetary union
1 . With this aim, we estimate a gravity model to measure 
and compare the impact of preferential agreements on trade and also, to infer the 
relevance of other determinants of bilateral trade flows such us geographic proximity, 
income levels, population and cultural similarities.  
This research can be viewed as an extension of Soloaga and Winters (2001) who 
introduced the Vinerian specification of integration effects with three different sets of 
dummy variables representing trade creation, export diversion and import diversion 
effects. Our main addition is to estimate these three integration effects in a dynamic 
panel-data framework. The justification of the use of a dynamic model is based on the 
accepted evidence showing that export series tend to be highly persistent. Chen and Tsai 
(2005) and Carrère (2006) can also be viewed as extensions of Soloaga and Winters 
(2001), however they both estimate static panel data models.  
The analysis is first undertaken for each year of our sample and for segmented sub-
periods with a static-panel model, in order to capture the temporal evolution of the   3
impacts on trade of the different variables considered. In a second step, a dynamic 
model for two different sub-periods is estimated using the first-differences estimator 
and the Blundell and Bond’s (1998) system-GMM estimator. The system-GMM 
estimator is the preferred technique since this procedure remedies some econometric 
problems such as regressor endogeneity, measurement error and weak instruments, and 
controls for time-invariant country-specific effects such as distance or common 
language. To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first
2 to offer some evidence of 
what should be the correct dynamic specification of the gravity model of trade in the 
framework of the system-GMM procedure. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the specification of the gravity 
model. Section 3 focuses on the empirical application, using the gravity model to assess 
normal levels of trade. Section 4 presents the results from the yearly and static panel 
estimations.  Section 5 focuses on the sensitivity analysis and shows the results for the 
dynamic panel estimations. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. The gravity equation of trade 
2.1 Model specification 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) were the first authors to apply the gravity 
equation to analyse international trade flows. Since then, the gravity model has been 
successfully applied to flows of varying types such as migration, foreign direct 
investment and more specifically to international trade flows. According to this model, 
exports from country i to country j are explained by their economic sizes (GDP or 
GNP), their populations, direct geographical distances and a set of dummies 
incorporating some type of institutional characteristics common to specific flows. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Therefore, we do not consider the effect of a common currency on trade. 
2 De Benedictis et al (2005) evaluated the effects of regional arrangement in the enlarged EU in a similar 
framework.   4
Although the theoretical support for the gravity model was originally very poor, since 
the second half of the 1970s several theoretical developments have filled this gap. 
Anderson (1979) made the first formal attempt to derive the gravity equation from a 
model that assumed product differentiation. Bergstrand (1985, 1989) also explored the 
theoretical determination of bilateral trade in a series of papers, in which gravity 
equations were associated with simple monopolistic competition models. Helpman 
(1987) used a differentiated product framework with increasing returns to scale to 
justify the gravity model. More recently, Deardorff (1995) has proven that the gravity 
equation characterises many models and can be justified from standard trade theories. 
Finally, Anderson and Wincoop (2003) derived an operational gravity model based on 
the manipulation of the CES expenditure system that can be easily estimated and helps 
to solve the so-called border puzzle. According to these authors, multilateral trade 
resistance factors should be added in the empirical estimation to correctly estimate the 
theoretical gravity model. A simple and intuitive way to do it is to proxy these terms 
with country dummy variables or with fixed effects in a panel data framework.  
There are a huge number of empirical applications in the literature on international trade 
which have contributed to the improvement of the performance of the gravity equation. 
Some of them are related to our work. Firstly, Mátyás (1997) and Harris and Mátyás 
(1998), Chen and Wall (1999), Breuss and Egger (1999) and Egger (2000, 2004) 
improved the econometric specification of the gravity equation. Secondly, Berstrand 
(1985), Helpman (1987), Wei, (1996), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Limao and 
Venables (2001) and Bougheas et al, (1999) among others, contributed to the 
refinement of the explanatory variables considered in the analysis and to the addition of 
new variables.    5
A number of recent papers are particularly linked to our investigation: Carrère (2006) 
who assessed regional trade agreements in a static panel framework and used a Vinerian 
specification of the integration effects. Chen and Tsai (2005) who estimated the staged 
effects of FTAs formation in a static panel data framework and considered the EU, 
NAFTA, LAFTA and MERCOSUR. Soloaga and Winters (2001) who analysed the 
effects of regionalism in the 90s by considering nine FTAs; Piani and Kume (2000), 
who studied bilateral trade flows between 44 countries involved in a number of 
agreements: NAFTA, ANDINO, MERCOSUR, EU, ASEAN and ANZCER; and  Blavy 
(2001) who investigated trade in the Mashrek, its determinants and potential. 
 According to the generalised gravity model of trade, the volume of exports between 
pairs of countries, Xij, is a function of their incomes (GDPs), their populations, their 
geographical distance and a set of dummies, 
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where Yi (Yj) indicates the GDPs of the exporter (importer), POPi (POPj) are exporter 
(importer) populations, DISTij measures the distance between the two countries’ 
capitals (or economic centres) and Fij  represents any other factors aiding or preventing 
trade between pairs of countries. uij  is the error term.  
We add to the basic specification two variables that are commonly considered in the 
recent literature: the land area of countries i and j and a variable named ‘remoteness’ 
indicating the average distance from the exporting country to importer partners.  
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where:    6
ln denotes variables in natural logs. 
Xijt  are the exports from country i to country j in period t at current US$.  
Yit, Yjt indicate the GDP of countries i and j respectively, in period t at current PPP US$. 
POPit, POPjt  denote the population of countries i and j respectively, in period t in 
thousand inhabitants. 
Ai, Aj denote the total area of countries i and j respectively in squared km. 
DISTij is the great circle distance between countries i and j. 
REMi  is the average distance of country i to exporter partners, weighted by exporters’ 
GDP share in world GDP. 
αij are the specific effects associated to each bilateral trade flow. They are a control for 
all the omitted variables that are specific for each trade flow and that are time invariant.   
t φ are specific time effects that control for omitted variables that are common for all 
trade flows but vary over time. A high level of income in the exporting country 
indicates a high level of production, which increases the availability of goods for export. 
Therefore we expect β1 to be positive. The coefficient of Yj, β2, is also expected to be 
positive since a high level of income in the importing country suggests higher imports. 
The coefficient estimate for population of the exporters, β3, may be negatively or 
positively signed (Oguledo and Macphee, 1994), depending on whether the country 
exports less when it is big (absorption effect) or whether a big country exports more 
than a small country (economies of scale). The coefficient of the importer population, 
β4, also has an ambiguous sign, for similar reasons. Another factor that may influence 
the coefficient estimates for population is the composition effect that influences supply 
and demand. Each country produces and exports a different mix of commodities 
(supply) and the mix of goods demanded is also different for each country. The distance 
coefficient is expected to be negative since it is a proxy of all possible trade costs. The   7
coefficients of the areas of countries i and j are expected to be negative (bigger 
countries are better endowed and therefore trade less) and the coefficient for remoteness 
is expected to be positive. The model includes dummy variables for trading partners 
sharing a common language (langij), sharing a common border (adjij) and for islands 
(islij) as well as trading blocs' dummy variables, defined as Dkm which evaluate the 
effects of preferential trading agreements (PTAs). 
2.2 Trade creating and trade diverting effects 
Since the evaluation of the effects of PTAs on trade is central to this research, some 
further explanations are needed. A similar approach to the most recent developments in 
this area (Soloaga and Winters; 2001 and Carrère (2005)) is adopted. Viner’s trade 
creation and trade diversion are specified by including three dummy variables per FTA. 
The first one has been traditionally considered in the gravity model literature (it proxies 
for intra-bloc trade), the second (members’ imports from non-members) and third 
(members’ exports to non-members) were initially specified as a single dummy to 
capture extra-bloc trade (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997; Frankel, 1997, and Frankel 
and Wei, 1998). Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Chen and Tsai (2005) also specified 
three set of dummies separately. However, these authors’ dummies are different to ours 
since they separate intra-bloc trade (bk), total members’ imports (mk) and total 
members’ exports (nk). Their specification is, 
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were Mij are imports of country i from country j. EVij are the rest of explanatory 
variables. Pkm is a dummy that takes the value 1 if m is a member of bloc k and 0 
otherwise. Our specification of the Viner’s trade creation and trade diversion is given 
by,   8
 
    (4) 
        
where Xij are exports from country i to country j, EVij is defined as in equation 3 above. 
Dk is a dummy that takes the value 1 if both countries, i and j, belong to the same 
economic bloc, 0 otherwise. Dki is a dummy that takes the value 1 if i is a member of 
bloc k and j belongs to the rest of the world, 0 otherwise. Dkj is a dummy that takes the 
value 1 if j is a member of bloc k and i belongs to the rest of the world, 0 otherwise. γk 
measures the extent to which trade is higher than normal levels if both countries, i and j 
are members of the bloc, δk measures the extent to which members’ exports are higher 
than normal levels to non-member countries and ρk measures the extent to which 
members’ imports are higher than normal levels from non-member countries. δk and ρk 
could be interpreted as a measure for trade diversion effects; however we think that they 
combine trade diversion and openness effects. The relationships between the 
coefficients of the first and second specifications are:   
bk=γk;  mk= γk+ρk  and nk= γk +δk. 
We believe that our specification directly identifies export and import diversion and 
openness effects, depurated from the increase in trade due to the RTA membership and 
is therefore preferred. Table 1 identifies the possible outcomes following an RTA. For 
example, an increase in intra-bloc exports (γk>0) along with a higher propensity to imports 
(ρk>0) indicates pure trade creation in terms of imports, whereas a decrease in intra-bloc 
exports (γk<0) along with a higher propensity to imports (ρk>0) indicates an extra-bloc 
import expansion (imports from the rests of the world increase). 
3. Empirical application 
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We estimated bilateral exports of 47 countries
3 over the period 1980-1999. Our data-set 
is an unbalanced panel with a maximum of 43,240 observations (47x46x20). Equation 
(2) was estimated for different years and sub-periods by applying several 
methodologies. In the year-by-year estimations Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) were 
used. Although the appropriate estimation method should be a Tobit model, only 10% 
of the exports are recorded as zero, this refinement only change slightly the estimation 
results relative to the OLS method
4. In the estimations for segmented sub-periods we 
used the between estimator (averaging the data over every 4-5 years) for the static panel 
and the first-differenced GMM and system GMM for the dynamic panel. For 
estimations with different groups of countries we used the within estimator (two ways 
fixed effects) and the generalised least squares with random effect for the whole sample 
period. A Hausman test is used to decide between both estimation techniques.  
The between estimator exploits the between dimension of the data (differences between 
individuals). It is determined as the OLS estimator in a regression of individual 
averages of the dependent variable, y,  on individual averages of the explanatory 
variables, x, and a constant. This estimator is used in order to evaluate the importance of 
differences between trading partners in our model and to test for the equality of the 
estimated coefficients for different sub periods. The within estimator is obtained from a 
transformed model. This is a regression model in deviations from individual means and 
does not include the individual effects. The transformation that produces observations in 
deviation from individual means is called the within transformation. This transformation 
exploits variation within individuals (trading partners) over time. 
In all the estimations heteroskedastic consistent standard errors were computed since the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected when testing for heteroscedasticity. 
                                                           
3 Countries are listed in the Appendix. 
4 Results are available upon request.   10
For the yearly and segmented sub-periods estimations (Tables 2, 3 and 4) the White test 
statistic was used, by computing N times the R
2 of an auxiliary regression of 
2 ˆi ε  on a 
constant and all first moments, second moments and cross products of the original 
regressors. The resulting test statistic NR
2 has an asymptotic Chi-squared distribution 
with P degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, where P is the 
number of regressors in the auxiliary regression. 
In a panel data context (Table 5) we test for heteroscedasticity in εij using a variant of 
the Breusch-Pagan test. This test uses the fixed effects residuals  ˆit ε . The auxiliary 
regression of the test regresses the squared within residuals 
2 ˆit ε  upon a constant and the 
J variables zit that we think may affect heteroskedasticity. Under the null hypothesis, the 
test statistic, computed as N(T-1) times the R
2 of the auxiliary regression, will have an 
asymptotic Chi-squared distribution, with J degrees of freedom. 
4. Results for the Static model   
4.1 Basic results 
Tables (2) to (5) show the results for the yearly estimations and for the static panel 
estimations. Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the entire sample (47 
countries) in five different years. The exporter income elasticity remains fairly constant, 
increasing slightly (from 1 in 1980 to 1.21 in 1999) in the period analysed. However, 
the importer income elasticity considerably decreases in magnitude (from 1.65 in 1980 
to 0.34 in 1999). The declining magnitude of the coefficients of the importer country 
indicates an increasing inelasticity of bilateral trade with respect to the income of the 
importing country. The population coefficients of the exporting country are negative 
signed and remain rather constant, declining slightly in the 90s. The negative sign 
indicates that more populated countries export less since a higher proportion of their 
production is directed to the internal market. The population coefficients of the   11
importing country are also negative signed but only until 1994. From 1995 to 1999 they 
are positive and significant in all years. The positive sign indicates that country size is 
directly related to trade. Larger countries have a greater capacity to absorb imports than 
do their smaller counterparts. This result points to an uneven distribution of costs and 
benefits of integration in favour of the bigger countries that will industrialise more 
rapidly.  
The coefficient of area for the exporter is negative and significant in the 90s, showing 
that larger countries are endowed with more resources and thus would be more self-
sufficient. However, the importer area coefficient is positive and significant until 1990 
and then it changes sign but is not significant. 
The coefficient of the distance variable has the expected negative sign and is highly 
significant in every year. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient remains fairly 
constant within the range (-1.04,-1.23). The remoteness variable, added to control for 
“overall trade resistance” is not significant in any of the years. The language dummy 
has the expected positive sign and is significant in all years. The magnitude of the 
coefficient increases yearly in the 1985-1995 time period. This may indicate that 
language and culture differences are increasing in importance as a factor creating trade 
resistance. Two countries sharing a common language trade 301% [(exp(1.39)-1]*100 
more in 1999 (according to our results), than countries speaking a different language. 
The adjacency and island dummies are in general not significant at 5% level and the 
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are always very small. Surprisingly, sharing a 
border does not influence trade. The explanation of the lack of significance may be the 
fact that the distance and integration dummy variables are already accounting for 
proximity between trading countries. 
4.2 Trade creation and trade diversion effects   12
The dummy variables for membership in a trade preference scheme show mixed results. 
For the EU, the coefficients of the three sets of dummies are positive for all years and 
almost all are statistically significant, apart from the EUX (exports to non-EU members) 
coefficient in several years. Contrary to Soloaga and Winters (2001) the intra-bloc 
coefficient (EU) increases yearly in magnitude and we find no evidence of trade 
diversion since EUX and EUM (imports from non-members) present positive 
coefficients. These results would indicate the consolidation and effectiveness of this 
group as an integration scheme. According to Table 1, the results from the OLS yearly 
regressions indicate a pure trade creation effect. 
For NAFTA the intra-bloc dummies (NAFTA) are positive signed and highly 
significant only from 1995 onwards. For exports to non-members (NAFTAX) the 
coefficient is almost always non significant and for imports from non-members 
(NAFTAM) is negative and non-significant in the eighties and positive and significant 
in the nineties, pointing towards an increase in the degree of openness. Once again we 
find no evidence of trade diversion.  
Coefficients for the dummy variables for the CARICOM intra–bloc dummy are all 
positive and significant. The CARICM (imports from non-CARICOM countries) 
coefficient is always negative and significant from 1995 onwards showing evidence of 
an import diversion effect, whereas CARICX (exports to non-CARICOM countries) 
shows a negative and non-significant coefficient. In the 90s, the import diversion effect 
outweighs the intra-bloc positive effect, indicating therefore a pure import diversion 
effect. 
CACM, which appeared strong in the 1960s and began to disintegrate in the 1970s, 
present positive coefficients for the intra-bloc dummy in all years, but they are declining 
yearly and lose significance in the second half of the 1990s. Similar to the CARICOM,   13
imports from non-members (CACMM) present always negative coefficients that are 
only significant from 1995 onwards showing evidence of an import diversion effect, 
whereas CACMX (exports to non-members) shows a negative and non-significant 
coefficient. 
Finally, coefficients for the dummy variables for MAGREB and MASHREK are 
insignificant in the early years and significant and negative signed in many years, 
showing the ineffectiveness of these two groups. We find evidence of import diversion 
effects in the second half of the nineties and intra-bloc trade is below normal levels of 
trade according to the gravity model. According to Table 1 trade contraction and trade 
diversion effects, for both imports and exports dominate in these regions. 
In order to check for the robustness of the yearly results, in Table 3 we replace the 
remoteness variable with exporter and importer dummies (αi,  αj) to proxy for 
multilateral resistance terms. According to Anderson and Wincoop (2001), this is the 
“correct specification” of the gravity model. The results concerning integration 
dummies change significantly, especially for developing countries. The coefficients are 
in general larger than in Table 2. The trade creation effect of the EU and NAFTA 
countries is magnified and the coefficients are positive and significant (with only one 
exception, the EU coefficient is negative and insignificant in 1981). EUX (EU exports 
to non-members) shows now a negative coefficient that is only significant in the 80s 
and early 90s, indicating export diversion effects and hence a decrease in welfare for 
non-members. EUM (EU imports from non-members) shows a positive coefficient as in 
Table 2, but much higher in magnitude, indicating import expansion effects. 
With respect to CACM and CARICOM, the trade creation effect mainly disappears in 
most years (only positive and significant in 1999 for CARICOM) and trade diversion is 
found for CACM exports and imports and for CARICOM imports. CARICOM exports   14
to non-members (CARICX) show a positive coefficient (in Table 2 the sign was 
negative) indicating positive welfare effects for non-members. 
The Magreb and Mashrek regions present now positive intra-trade effects starting in the 
second half of the 90s and also positive effects for exports to third countries in the 90s. 
We find these results questionable. The inclusion of exporter and importer dummies 
together with the Vinerian integration effects may be problematic since the two sets of 
variables are correlated. A way to solve this problem is the use of panel data and the 
inclusion in the regressions of dyadic fixed effects (αij). 
4.3 Stability over time 
Table 4 shows estimation results for segmented sub-periods. We used the between 
estimator averaging the data over every 4-5 years. We only show the results for the 
regressions that include the remoteness variable as a proxy for multilateral resistance, 
since the inclusion of X and M dummies does not improve the fit of the results and 
creates problems concerning the interpretation of the trade creation and trade diversion 
effects. The results in terms of signs and magnitude of the estimated coefficients remain 
fairly similar to those obtained in the yearly estimations (Table 2). They are smaller in 
magnitude for the between estimator, which is to be expected since they are generally 
interpreted as long run parameters.   
Similar regressions were run adding dyadic trading-pair effects (fixed/random) to 
control for multilateral trade resistance. In this way we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems are reduced. The Hausman tests always 
rejected the null hypothesis of ortogonality between the individual effects and the 
regressors indicating that only the FE estimates are consistent. However the within 
variation in these short time spans produces a very poor goodness of fit, hence the 
between estimator is preferred.   15
4.4 Different effects for developed and developing countries 
Table (5) presents the results obtained when the sample is divided into developed 
exporters and developing exporters: EU and NAFTA (column 1) and Latin American 
and Mediterranean Countries (column 2). The estimated coefficients present, in most 
cases, the expected signs and magnitudes. Income elasticities (exporter and importer) 
are positively signed and the coefficient and t-value for the exporter is greater than that 
for the importer. This indicates that the income elasticity of mutual trade is more elastic 
with respect to the exporting country's income than it is to the importing country's 
income and highlights the importance of a country's production capacity in fostering 
exports, especially for developed countries. 
The estimated coefficients for the exporter population variable are negatively signed 
which shows an absorption effect, the greater the size of the exporter, the lower the 
exports. The estimated coefficients corresponding to the importer population is positive 
signed and higher in magnitude and significance level for EU-NAFTA countries. The 
positive sign points towards the growing importance of the role played by scale 
economies and market-size effects in international trade models specially for developed 
countries (the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is five times higher than the one 
for developing countries). The area coefficient is negative and significant for developing 
countries; however it is positive and significant only for the importer country for 
developed countries. This result may indicate that natural resources and land extension 
is more important for developing than for developed countries.  
Concerning geographic distance, the estimated coefficient presents a negative sign with 
elasticities of 1.84 for EU and NAFTA exports and 1.03 for LA and Mediterranean 
exports. The remoteness variable is only positive and significant for developing 
countries, indicating that only developing trading partners’ trade more when they are far   16
from the rest of the world, but this is not the case for developed countries. The dummy 
variable common language (lang), which takes the value one when the countries share 
the language presents a positive sign and is almost always significant which indicates 
the great importance of cultural similarities in international trade. However, the 
magnitude of the coefficients of this dummy is half in magnitude for developed 
countries. On the other hand, sharing a border does not seem to be relevant for 
developing countries since the coefficient is insignificant and for developed countries 
the coefficient is negative and significant. 
Interpretation of the integration dummies indicates that intra-EU trade is 87% higher 
than expected from the gravity equation results {= [exp(0.63)-1]*100}. Intra-NAFTA 
trade is 186% higher than expected from normal levels of trade {= [exp(1.05)-1]*100}. 
Concerning trade diversion and openness effects, in this estimation we find a positive 
coefficient for members’ imports from non-members, but a negative and significant 
coefficient for members’ exports to non-members. With respect to developing countries, 
the CARICOM region shows a positive and significant intra-bloc trade effect (CARIC) 
that is more than compensated with negative extra-bloc import and export effects 
(CARICM, CARICX); hence resulting in trade diversion. The CACM dummy (intra 
bloc trade) is also positive but non significant and the import and export diversion 
effects dominate. The Magreb and Mashrek dummies show all negative intra and extra 
trade effects, confirming the prevalence of trade contraction and trade diversion effects 
in these regions. 
5. Analysis in a dynamic framework 
There is one more concern that deserves investigation. We have considered until now a 
static model ruling out the possibility that current exports depend on past exports 
volumes. This possibility is quite plausible since several authors have shown that   17
exports are subject to hysteresis and therefore in time series analysis the export series 
tend to be highly persistent. In order to obtain consistent estimates in dynamic panels, 
instrumental variable procedures have to be used. The first differences-GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) has commonly been used in the literature of 
dynamic panel data estimations. However, when data are highly persistent, as in the 
case of bilateral exports flows, Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that this procedure can 
be improved by using the system GMM estimation, which supplements the equations in 
first differences with equations in levels, for the former the instruments used are the 
lagged levels and for the latter the instruments are the lagged differences.  
With these points in mind, we estimate a dynamic gravity model for two sub-samples. 
Results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the results for the period 1981-
89 and Table 7 for the period 1990-99. For comparative purposes both tables present 
three set of estimations. The first three columns present the pooled OLS with time 
effects estimates, columns 3 to 6 present the within two ways fixed effects estimates and 
columns seven to nine show the  system GMM with time effects estimates. The 
coefficient on the lagged exports (adjustment coefficient) is always statistically 
significant at 1% level, confirming our thought that the gravity model of trade should be 
estimated in a dynamic form. 
The main difference with respect to the static panel concerning the estimated 
coefficients is that most of them are lower in magnitude. Moreover, the coefficient on 
the adjacency dummy is now positive and significant whereas the coefficient on the 
language variable is non-significant, these results change with respect to the static panel 
estimations
5. The GMM system estimator provides better results in terms of standard 
errors, meaning that the fitted values are more precise and therefore, misspecification is 
reduced considerably.    18
Especial attention should be paid to the integration effects that are significantly lower 
when using the system GMM estimation. With respect to the EU (for both periods) and 
NAFTA (in the 90s only) the results confirm the existence of a pure trade creation 
effect. The total effect in the 90s for the EU (EU+EUM+EUX) is 0.15 which translates 
into 16.18%{= [exp(0.15)-1]*100}and for NAFTA (NAFTA+NAFTAM+NAFTAX) is 
0.31 which translates into 36.34% above what is predicted by the dynamic gravity 
model. For developing countries we find a clear dominance of export and import 
diversion effects that compensate trade creation in most cases (apart from CARIC trade 
in the 80s). The Magreb and Mashrek dummies indicate trade destruction and 
significant import diversion effects that are statistically significant in the 90s only. 
Our average results are comparable to Carrère (2006). She evaluates the total trade 
effects for 7 RTAs over the period 1962-1996, and also their evolution over time. We 
obtain similar results concerning trade diversion effects in CACM and positive intra-
bloc effects in EU and NAFTA in the 80s and 90s. However, contrary to Carrère (2006) 
we do not find evidence of trade diversion effects in the 90s for the EU and NAFTA. 
The reason could be that Asian countries are not considered in our sample and that trade 
diversion occurred with them or that in the period 1997-99 the EUM dummy is positive 
and significant and therefore the average effect is positive. The first explanation seems 
more plausible. These conflicting results deserve further investigation.  
A final matter of concern is the treatment of the presence of heterogeneity in the mix of 
countries considered in a dynamic context. The integration effects could differ for single 
countries. We also leave this subject for further research, since the main aim of this 
paper is to show what the average effects are for all the members of each regional 
group. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5  Income, population, area and remoteness coefficients are not shown in order to save space.   19
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this research was to investigate the static effects of regional integration 
agreements in the last two decades in a static and dynamic framework. 
Our results indicate that the variables traditionally included in the gravity equation are 
statistically significant and highlight the role played by intra and extra-bloc effects. The 
estimated coefficients present, in most cases, the expected signs and magnitudes. 
Income elasticities (exporter and importer) are positively signed and are close to unity 
according to the theory. The estimated coefficient for the exporter population variable is 
negatively signed which shows an absorption effect, the greater the size of the exporter, 
the lower the exports. However, the estimated coefficient corresponding to the importer 
population is only negatively signed until 1990. From 1991 onwards, the sign is positive 
which points towards the growing importance of the role played by scale economies and 
market-size effects in international trade models. Concerning geographic distance, its 
coefficient presents a negative sign with elasticities around 1.5. 
Interpretation of the integration dummies according to the system GMM estimation 
results indicates that intra-EU trade is 6.2% higher than expected from the gravity 
equation and intra-NAFTA trade is 22.14% higher than expected from normal levels of 
trade. However, intra-CARICOM, intra-CACM, intra-MAGREB and intra-MASHREK 
trade are lower than expected according to the gravity model. 
We show evidence indicating that the new wave of regionalism in the 1990s has had 
positive effects on intra-bloc trade in the short term mainly for developed countries (EU 
and NAFTA), whereas for developing countries the results show some evidence of 
import diversion effects for CACM and CARICOM, MAGREB and MASHREK. In 
these blocs there is less scope to increase trade since the country members have a very 
similar production structure.   20
TABLE 1. Interpreting static integration effects 
Coefficient Extra-Bloc:  Imports (ρk)  Exports (δk) 
Intra-Bloc: Sign  +  -  +  - 








γk  - ME  MD+MC  XE  XD+XC 
Note: TC denotes trade creation in terms of imports (M) or in terms of exports (X), MD and XD denote 
import and export diversion respectively, ME and XE denote extra-bloc import and extra-bloc export 
expansion respectively and MC and XC denote intra-bloc import and intra-bloc export contraction 
respectively.   21
TABLE 2. Results from yearly estimations with remoteness 
Variables  1981  1985 1990 1995
   
1999 
Dependent var: LOG(X)  Coef  t-Stat Coef t-Stat Coef t-Stat Coef t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
C  -16.85  -1.17 -36.63 -3.35 -38.82 -3.26 -13.44 -1.14  -16.58  -1.11
LOG(YI)  1.00  2.48 1.57 5.08 1.56 4.63 1.09 3.32  1.21  3.00
LOG(YJ)  1.65  12.35 1.57 13.53 1.83 17.04 0.53 7.13  0.34  6.85
LOG(PI)  -0.72  -5.52 -0.80 -6.42 -0.71 -6.73 -0.55 -5.34  -0.43  -3.89
LOG(PJ)  -0.98  -6.82 -0.81 -6.50 -1.09 -9.44 0.33 4.64  0.45  6.84
LOG(AREAI)  0.03  0.65 -0.04 -0.78 -0.09 -2.04 -0.04 -1.08  -0.12  -2.72
LOG(AREAJ)  0.20  4.08 0.14 3.13 0.10 2.18 -0.06 -1.72  -0.02  -0.37
LOG(D)  -1.10  -11.61 -1.04 -13.26 -1.07 -15.72 -1.12 -16.27  -1.23  -13.66
LOG(REM)  -0.38  -1.09 0.09 0.34 0.05 0.16 -0.29 -1.00  -0.12  -0.33
EU  0.44  2.48 0.55 3.72 0.59 3.87 1.81 9.15  1.78  7.68
EUX  0.77  3.81 0.68 3.80 0.27 1.54 0.35 1.93  0.15  0.72
EUM  0.94  6.04 0.84 5.71 0.60 4.45 1.84 11.07  1.88  11.13
NAFTA  0.26  0.51 0.27 0.57 0.22 0.44 2.33 4.67  2.63  4.74
NAFTAM  -0.12  -0.52 -0.29 -1.35 -0.22 -1.01 1.26 5.28  1.29  5.06
NAFTAX  0.06  0.19 -0.07 -0.21 -0.12 -0.44 -0.26 -1.00  0.11  0.37
CACM  1.16  2.76 0.85 2.25 1.23 3.83 0.55 1.27  0.12  0.33
CACMM  -0.05  -0.23 0.27 1.15 0.26 1.16 -0.44 -2.14  -0.92  -4.36
CACMX  0.20  0.82 0.02 0.11 -0.32 -1.76 -0.23 -1.20  -0.06  -0.30
CARIC  1.71  5.93 1.60 5.18 1.31 4.43 0.90 3.25  0.98  3.45
CARICM  -0.31  -1.40 -0.19 -0.95 -0.18 -1.02 -1.04 -5.99  -1.47  -8.37
CARICX  -0.35  -2.04 -0.20 -1.27 -0.17 -1.22 0.00 0.02  -0.07  -0.46
MAGREB  -0.53  -0.73 -0.94 -0.94 0.31 0.73 -0.14 -0.41  -1.55  -3.19
MAGM  -0.43  -1.45 -0.54 -1.95 -0.19 -0.67 -0.86 -3.94  -1.36  -5.42
MAGX  0.34  1.36 0.34 1.48 0.29 1.31 -0.01 -0.07  -0.39  -1.62
MASHREK  -1.63  -1.62 -0.91 -2.73 0.25 0.63 -1.05 -2.96  -2.77  -8.45
MASHM  -1.39  -3.66 -1.45 -4.28 -0.37 -1.37 -1.64 -7.67  -1.87  -8.35
MASHX  1.00  3.98 0.84 3.73 0.63 2.97 0.45 2.30  -0.25  -1.20
ISL  -0.26  -1.34 -0.50 -2.70 -0.21 -1.46 -0.15 -1.20  0.05  0.33
LANG  1.19  6.48 1.21 6.69 1.38 8.72 1.39 9.86  1.39  10.27
ADJ  0.04  0.13 0.07 0.31 0.21 0.96 -0.27 -1.29  -0.31  -1.63
Adjusted R
2  0. 71  0.73 0.77 0.79   0.79 
Nobs  1205  1302 1461 1593   1440 
S.E.  1.76  1.66 1.64 1.57   1.60 
Akaike  4.80  4.75 5.32 5.93   5.45 
NR2  97.93*  78.25* 71.74* 84.58*   83.12* 
Note: Estimation uses White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. EU, NAFTA, 
CACM, CARIC, MAGREB, MASHREK denote intra-bloc trade effects, EUM, NAFTAM, CACMM, 
CARICM, MAGREBM, MASHREKM denote import diversion effects and  EUX, NAFTAX, CACMX, 
CARICX, MAGREBX, MASHREKX denote export diversion effects.    22
TABLE 3. Results from the yearly estimations with trade resistance dummies 
 
Notes: Estimation uses White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. Variables that 
are country specific (incomes, populations and areas) are excluded from the regressions. EU, NAFTA, 
CACM, CARIC, MAGREB, MASHREK denote trade creation effects, EUM, NAFTAM, CACMM, 
CARICM, MAGREBM, MASHREKM denote import diversion effects and  EUX, NAFTAX, CACMX, 
CARICX, MAGREBX, MASHREKX denote export diversion effects. Nr denotes no reported (47X and 
47M dummies). * denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
  Variables:  Years            
Dependent var:  1981    1985    1990    1995    1999    
LOG(X)  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio  Coef.  t-ratio 
LOG(D)  -1.12  -11.86  -1.11  -12.27  -1.13  -13.51  -1.12  -13.97  -1.26  -15.24
ISL  -2.20  -2.06  -0.02  -0.03  -0.29  -0.46  0.49  0.83  1.02  1.34
LANG  0.79  4.14  0.80  4.35  0.93  5.48  1.12  7.40  0.98  6.69
ADJ  0.06  0.17  0.20  0.75  0.04  0.14  -0.04  -0.18  -0.20  -0.74
UE  -0.65  -1.20  0.98  1.90  0.88  2.03  2.93  5.79  2.71  5.46
UEX  -2.49  -4.58  -1.02  -1.94  -1.84  -4.08  -0.42  -0.82  -0.57  -1.13
UEM  2.74  18.06  2.68  18.60  2.78  17.75  3.51  21.60  3.47  20.37
NAFTA  4.72  4.14  4.58  4.89  -    7.84  7.13  -   
NAFTAX  0.89  1.03  0.84  1.28  -4.09  -5.17  2.47  3.09  -5.45  -7.22
NAFTAM  3.10  13.51  2.82  13.00  3.10  13.76  3.98  18.36  4.15  19.3
CACM  -1.60  -2.67  -1.53  -4.33  -0.71  -2.39  0.45  0.70  0.06  0.1
CACMM  -1.27  -6.53  -1.24  -6.04  -1.32  -6.45  -0.43  -2.24  -0.67  -3.41
CACMX  -1.12  -1.74  -0.42  -1.04  -0.22  -0.65  -0.24  -0.36  -0.62  -1.07
CARIC  -0.04  -0.10  0.17  0.42  -0.11  -0.28  0.41  1.22  0.73  2.29
CARICX  1.18  3.05  1.85  5.23  1.29  3.25  1.02  2.80  1.17  3.5
CARICM  -2.70  -14.53  -2.69  -15.50  -2.60  -15.07  -2.02  -12.54  -1.86  -11.2
MAGREB  -    -6.05  -5.36  -    1.92  1.87  3.82  4.83
MAGX  3.09  2.88  -4.71  -8.55  0.32  0.52  1.36  1.59  3.47  3.52
MAGM  -0.74  -2.74  -0.80  -3.41  -0.62  -2.56  0.03  0.13  -0.24  -1.05
MASHREK  -2.41  -2.44  -2.34  -3.34  0.20  0.19  0.65  0.78  2.65  2.56
MASHX  0.24  0.29  0.50  0.84  2.29  2.36  1.73  2.22  3.99  4.05
MASHM  -2.58  -9.35  -2.53  -9.97  -2.09  -8.39  -1.17  -5.59  -1.13  -5.37
X-M dummies  nr    nr    nr    nr    nr 
Adjusted R
2  0.75    0.67    0.69    0.75    0.74    
Nobs  1205     1302     1461     1593     1440    
NR2  87.45*    96.32*    68.59*    93.16*    98.09*   
Akaike  6.9    6.8    7.04     6.8    7.2     23
Table 4. Estimation results for segmented sub-periods with remoteness 
Variables  1981-1985  1986-89  1990-95  1996-1999 
Dependent var:LOG(X)  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat 
C  -32.59  -5.94  -45.45  -6.81  -23.35  -4.74  -15.54  -2.19 
LOG(YI)  1.48  9.57  1.73  9.42  1.37  9.90  1.12  5.80 
LOG(YJ)  1.58  29.26  1.68  32.91  0.89  16.44  0.45  14.18 
LOG(PI)  -0.77  -13.54  -0.74  -13.44  -0.69  -15.83  -0.45  -8.31 
LOG(PJ)  -0.85  -14.77  -0.92  -16.26  -0.07  -1.33  0.44  13.28 
LOG(AI)  -0.05  -2.48  -0.04  -1.70  -0.06  -3.47  -0.08  -4.34 
LOG(AJ)  0.16  7.92  0.13  5.89  0.02  0.90  -0.08  -3.92 
LOG(D)  -1.09  -29.47  -1.01  -27.58  -1.16  -39.62  -1.22  -29.29 
LOG(RM)  0.00  0.00  0.24  1.43  -0.10  -0.86  -0.18  -1.07 
EU  0.51  7.21  0.71  8.85  1.05  15.10  1.75  15.56 
EUX  0.66  7.95  0.54  6.08  0.30  4.22  0.19  1.86 
EUM  0.91  13.82  0.60  8.45  1.14  18.69  1.79  22.08 
NAFTA  0.37  1.74  0.01  0.02  1.31  6.50  2.59  9.84 
NAFTAM  -0.09  -0.89  -0.40  -3.64  0.32  3.36  1.37  11.70 
NAFTAX  0.08  0.58  -0.23  -1.60  -0.07  -0.67  -0.01  -0.05 
CACM  1.10  6.40  1.02  5.91  0.34  2.11  0.42  2.46 
CACMM  0.17  1.62  0.08  0.71  -0.69  -7.23  -0.52  -5.09 
CACMX  0.06  0.60  -0.10  -1.04  -0.18  -2.20  -0.13  -1.36 
CARIC  1.67  12.54  1.53  10.57  0.74  6.04  0.75  5.56 
CARICM  -0.18  -1.91  -0.27  -2.88  -1.02  -12.22  -1.13  -13.53 
CARICX  -0.28  -3.85  -0.18  -2.45  -0.04  -0.66  -0.02  -0.26 
MAGREB  -1.04  -2.67  -0.08  -0.24  -0.21  -1.61  -1.19  -4.94 
MAGM  -0.40  -3.10  -0.45  -3.34  -1.09  -10.50  -1.06  -9.26 
MAGX  0.48  4.43  0.24  2.14  0.15  1.53  -0.33  -2.90 
MASHEK  -1.49  -3.84  -0.17  -0.43  -1.17  -7.55  -1.99  -11.38 
MASHM  -1.31  -8.56  -0.82  -5.72  -1.70  -15.78  -1.79  -17.28 
MASHX  0.91  8.39  0.59  5.11  0.57  7.00  0.02  0.20 
ISL  -0.46  -5.49  -0.19  -2.63  -0.22  -3.94  -0.10  -1.45 
LANG  1.20  14.65  1.31  15.95  1.27  21.18  1.38  20.29 
ADJ  0.01  0.14  0.02  0.20  -0.17  -2.02  -0.34  -3.42 
Adjusted R
2    0.73    0.76    0.78    0.79 
Nobs    7158    6814    7880    6290 
S.E.     1.67    0.62    1.62    1.57 
Akaike     3.87    3.81    3.81    3.76 
NR2    89.91*    85.58*    75.84*    96.21* 
Notes: Estimation uses White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. EU, NAFTA, 
CACM, CARIC, MAGREB, MASHREK denote trade creation effects, EUM, NAFTAM, CACMM, 
CARICM, MAGREBM, MASHREKM denote import diversion effects and  EUX, NAFTAX, CACMX, 
CARICX, MAGREBX, MASHREKX denote export diversion effects. * denotes significance at 1% level. 
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TABLE 5. Estimation results for developed and developing exporters 
1981-99  
Variables 
EU and NAFTA 
(Random Effects) 
Developing countries 
(Two ways fixed effects) 
Dependent var:LOG(X)  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat 
C  3.08  0.52  -33.23  -10.45 
LOG(YI)  0.87  9.25  1.21  13.55 
LOG(YJ)  0.10  3.97  0.99  22.25 
LOG(PI)  -0.39  -3.05  -0.42  -11.01 
LOG(PJ)  0.55  9.02  0.09  1.88 
LOG(AI)  0.02  0.24  -0.05  -3.16 
LOG(AJ)  0.18  3.21  -0.10  -7.99 
LOG(D)  -1.84  -26.42  -1.03  -43.36 
LOG(RM)  -0.52  -2.94  0.22  2.77 
EU  0.63  19.28  -  - 
EUX  -0.39  -4.68  -  - 
EUM  0.79  9.06  -  - 
NAFTA  1.05  2.65  -  - 
NAFTAM  1.40  5.83  -  - 
NAFTAX  -0.49  -1.71  -  - 
CACM  -  -  0.13  1.10 
CACMM  -  -  -0.91  -11.45 
CACMX  -  -  -0.24  -4.94 
CARIC  -  -  0.61  7.69 
CARICM  -  -  -1.06  -13.51 
CARICX  -  -  -0.29  -7.07 
MAGREB  -  -  -0.93  -6.02 
MAGM  -  -  -1.83  -17.02 
MAGX  -  -  0.41  6.80 
MASHEK  -  -  -1.58  -11.20 
MASHM  -  -  -1.88  -17.44 
MASHX  -  -  0.62  11.69 
ISL  -0.07  -0.42  -0.07  -1.20 
LANG  0.50  2.59  1.23  28.76 
ADJ  -0.65  -4.53  0.07  0.85 
Adj. R
2  0.79    0.65   
S.E.   0.93    1.77   
N(T-1)*R2(Auxiliar 
Regresion) 
75.92*    63.12*   
Nobs   8691    15221   
Note: Estimation uses White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. EU, NAFTA, 
CACM, CARIC, MAGREB, MASHREK denote trade creation effects, EUM, NAFTAM, CACMM, 
CARICM, MAGREBM, MASHREKM denote import diversion effects and  EUX, NAFTAX, CACMX, 
CARICX, MAGREBX, MASHREKX denote export diversion effects. * denotes significance at 1% level.   25
TABLE 6. Estimation results for dynamic panel 1981-89 
1981-1989 
Variables 
Pooled OLS with time 
effects (1) 
Within two ways fixed 
effects (2) 

















coefficient  0.79  77.71  0.25 10.98 0.91 103.69   
EU  0.15  4.93  0.71 0.13 4.62 0.17 0.07 3.16  0.78 
EUM  0.13  4.82  0.62 0.13 4.66 0.17 0.04 1.71  0.44 
EUX  0.08  2.30  0.38 0.07 1.89 0.09 0.02 0.58  0.22 
NAFTA  -0.02  -0.17  -0.10 -0.04 -0.46 -0.05 -0.06 -1.10  -0.67 
NAFTAM  -0.09  -1.92  -0.43 -0.09 -1.91 -0.12 -0.08 -2.66  -0.89 
NAFTAX  -0.07  -1.14  -0.33 -0.10 -1.76 -0.13 -0.07 -1.61  -0.78 
CACM  0.16  2.49  0.76 0.13 2.11 0.17 0.01 0.24  0.11 
CACMM  -0.02  -0.33  -0.10 -0.02 -0.54 -0.03 -0.00 -0.12  0.00 
CACMX  -0.03  -0.92  -0.14 -0.05 -1.26 -0.07 -0.07 -2.27  -0.78 
CARIC  0.32  5.39  1.52 0.29 5.07 0.39 0.10 2.17  1.11 
CARICM  -0.06  -1.42  -0.29 -0.06 -1.67 -0.08 -0.02 -0.66  -0.22 
CARICX  -0.05  -1.81  -0.24 -0.06 -2.18 -0.08 -0.03 -1.56  -0.33 
MAGREB  0.08  1.04  0.38 0.04 0.55 0.05 0.04 0.54  0.44 
MAGM  -0.10  -1.80  -0.48 -0.11 -2.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.76  -0.33 
MAGX  0.07  1.41  0.33 0.04 0.86 0.05 -0.02 -0.52  -0.22 
MASHREK  0.02  0.24  0.10 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.68  0.78 
MASHM  -0.19  -3.44  -0.90 -0.20 -3.71 -0.27 -0.01 -0.19  -0.11 
MASHX  0.13  2.60  0.62 0.13 2.78 0.17 -0.02 -0.44  -0.22 
ISL  -0.02  -0.73  -0.10 -0.03 -1.01 -0.04 -0.03 -1.20  -0.33 
ADJ  0.27  7.86  1.29 0.27 7.86 0.36 0.11 4.20  1.22 
LANG  0.01  0.38  0.05 0.01 0.32 0.01 -0.00 -0.03  0.00 
Adjusted R
2  0.91    0.93 0.91    
S.E.  0.94    0.81 0.90    
Obs  10689    10718 9064    
Akaike  2.72    2.54 -    
J-stat.  -    -   0.01    
Note: Estimation uses White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. Only integration 
effects are shown. EU, NAFTA, CACM, CARIC, MAGREB, MASHREK denote trade creation effects, 
EUM, NAFTAM, CACMM, CARICM, MAGREBM, MASHREKM denote import diversion effects and  
EUX, NAFTAX, CACMX, CARICX, MAGREBX, MASHREKX denote export diversion effects. 
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TABLE 7. Estimation results for dynamic panel 1990-99 
1990-1999 
Variables 
Pooled OLS with time 
effects (1) 
Within two ways fixed 
effects (2)  

















coefficient  0.83  201.11  0.28 14.07 0.95 171.64   
EU  0.17  5.12  1.00 0.18 6.51 0.25 0.06 3.44  1.20 
EUM  0.17  7.28  1.00 0.18 7.03 0.25 0.04 1.96  0.80 
EUX  0.02  0.90  0.12 0.02 0.65 0.03 0.05 2.30  1.00 
NAFTA  0.34  3.00  2.00 0.35 3.66 0.49 0.20 4.64  4.00 
NAFTAM  0.06  1.76  0.35 0.07 1.99 0.10 0.03 1.11  0.60 
NAFTAX  0.03  0.90  0.18 0.03 0.64 0.04 0.08 2.71  1.60 
CACM  0.05  0.79  0.29 0.04 0.75 0.06 0.03 0.90  0.60 
CACMM  -0.11  -3.80  -0.65 -0.12 -3.26 -0.17 -0.04 -1.34  -0.80 
CACMX  0.01  0.31  0.06 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.74  0.40 
CARIC  0.11  2.97  0.65 0.11 2.30 0.15 0.02 0.64  0.40 
CARICM  -0.20  -8.22  -1.18 -0.21 -6.82 -0.29 -0.08 -3.81  -1.60 
CARICX  -0.04  -1.79  -0.24 -0.04 -1.67 -0.06 -0.02 -1.46  -0.40 
MAGREB  -0.26  -2.37  -1.53 -0.28 -3.89 -0.39 -0.15 -2.60  -3.00 
MAGM  -0.22  -6.09  -1.29 -0.24 -5.02 -0.33 -0.09 -3.00  -1.80 
MAGX  -0.05  -1.29  -0.29 -0.06 -1.43 -0.08 -0.04 -1.60  -0.80 
MASHREK  -0.32  -3.66  -1.88 -0.34 -5.70 -0.47 -0.17 -3.88  -3.40 
MASHM  -0.32  -9.45  -1.88 -0.34 -8.24 -0.47 -0.10 -3.48  -2.00 
MASHX  0.08  2.25  0.47 0.08 2.39 0.11 -0.01 -0.22  -0.20 
ISL  -0.02  -0.84  -0.12 -0.02 -1.09 -0.03 0.02 1.27  0.40 
ADJ  0.21  9.54  1.24 0.22 9.09 0.31 0.06 3.62  1.20 
LANG  -0.04  -0.91  -0.24 -0.04 -1.29 -0.06 -0.02 -1.30  -0.40 
Adjusted R
2  0.94    0.95 0.93    
S.E.  0.83    0.71 0.82    
Nobs  14827    14865 14276    
Akaike  2.48    2.25 -    
J-stat.  -    - 0.02    
Note: Estimation uses White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator. Only integration 
effects are shown. EU, NAFTA, CACM, CARIC, MAGREB, MASHREK denote trade creation effects, 
EUM, NAFTAM, CACMM, CARICM, MAGREBM, MASHREKM denote import diversion effects and  
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Appendix 
Trade data (in current thousand US$) were obtained from Statistics Canada (2001), 
incomes at purchasing power parity prices (in thousand $) and populations are from the 
World Development Indicators CD (2001) and distance in kilometres between capitals 
are from http://www.indo.com/distance. 
List of regional blocs and countries: EU (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Greece, Ireland,  Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, 
Sweden); NAFTA (USA, Canada, Mexico); CACM (Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua as associated country), CARICOM 
(Barbados, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Rep., Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts Nev., 
Suriname, Trinidad Tobago) and Cuba; Magreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lybia); 
Mashrek (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria); other Mediterranean (Turkey, Cyprus 
and Malta). 
 